Despite the importance of European Union negotiations, the majority of scholarly attention has not been directed towards the means by which policy is co-ordinated in Member
Throughout 1990-91 the IGC did not receive particular attention at full Cabinet meetings unless specific problems needed to be discussed. Lamont does not remember being asked any serious questions on EMU during Cabinet discussions, and those which arose tended to be very short. 7 An EMU opt-out was Cabinet policy and therefore debates were of a technical nature which he considered colleagues would not have understood. 8 In comparison, Howard convinced the Cabinet of the dangers which could effect British industry if the UK agreed to have a Social Chapter inside the Treaty. 9 This
shows that only issues of the greatest significance, and those backed by influential Cabinet members, were addressed. Time restraints imposed on Cabinet meetings meant it was (and is) virtually impossible for detailed discussion to take place; meetings comprising some 22 members are generally too large to be an effective forum for reaching agreement.
Throughout 1991 Cabinet was overloaded with other topics, including the reform of the Community Charge, while the more imminent general election question loomed over all government policy. The end product of these factors was that the IGC proved not to be the top Ministerial priority. This affected the manner in which policy was resolved at the highest level. Whereas Cabinet was united in its desire for the UK to obtain a single currency opt-out, decisions involving wider consultation were not taken at an early stage on complex matters. Negotiators at official level were not provided with a full set of tactical instructions, only being made aware of general preferences which outlined what the government was against rather than how objectives could be obtained. This reflected John
Major's unwillingness and inability to impose policy on colleagues whom he had recently been dependent upon for his elevation to Prime Minister.
Discussion of European policy was generally referred by Major to the appropriate
Cabinet Committee, normally the Ministerial Sub-Committee on European Questions (OPD(E)). 10 Otherwise, he would ask Hurd to write to other Ministers and officials in advance with a proposed government line. 11 OPD(E), chaired by Hurd, was the principal discussion group at Ministerial level during the IGC, its term of reference being 'to consider questions relating to the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union and to report as necessary to the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy'. 12 The latter, (OPD), was its parent committee with a smaller membership comprising only six Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, who was not a member of OPD(E), and with a broader term of reference being 'to keep under review the Government's Defence and
Overseas policy'. 13 OPD, in its official composition, never discussed IGC issues, although towards the end of the negotiations an enlarged version had some discussions because
Major wanted to exercise direct influence on government policy when the prioritisation of unsolved issues, which by definition tended to be more significant, were debated. Such meetings effectively comprised OPD(E) members, but with the Prime Minister in the chair instead of the Foreign Secretary. This meant it was OPD(E) which highlighted the government's objectives, such as the need for the 'federal' goal to be deleted from Article A, hostility towards the Social Chapter, and a desire for the concept of subsidiarity (Article 3b) to be stated. In the formation of these objectives no special committees were established for the duration of the negotiations, and there were no special seminars. The very size of the European Secretariat, comprising 18 people including typists, meant it could not get involved in all aspects of the negotiations. In comparison, the equivalent organisation in Paris, the SGCI, has a staff of over 100 people and accordingly a greater remit. Where issues were the prerogative of a particular department, and would thus not throw up inter-departmental differences which needed to be resolved, the European Secretariat tended not to get involved, except peripherally. It was not involved in the monetary policy debate which was dealt with by the Treasury; or CFSP, which was mainly dealt with by the FCO; and was also not much involved in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), since this mostly fell within the Home Office's responsibilities.
The European Secretariat also influenced policy through its chairmanship of EQ(O), the official committee which dealt with routine Community business. 18 Its purpose, like other official Cabinet Committees, was to serve Members of the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister in particular, by settling those issues which could be decided at an early stage of discussion.
Otherwise, because the European Secretariat's work involved dealing with Treaty language, legal advice was essential. This included giving considered and authoritative determinations of legal matters arising in the IGC and other EC questions. On more important issues, it involved chairing committees of legal advisers from different government departments to produce a co-ordinated view. On issues where the legal position might bear on policy, policy makers as well as lawyers could be present. The result of involving such officials in the creation of a common position was, as Wallace notes, '...to leave little leeway to individual departments or officials to depart from agreed lines of reasoning'. 19 But, if differences of opinion arose (or where questions were of such importance or political sensitivity that Ministers needed to consider them collectively), then its job was to isolate the questions and present them in the best possible light for discussion. In that respect, it is unlike the Chancellery in Bonn, which exists to inject a view from the Chancellor through a policy-making role, partly a result of the loosely co-ordinated nature of European policy within Germany. The Cabinet Office is never in a position to force its position on other departments because of its co-ordinating role. 20 Hadley's specific job was to chair the more important meetings on the co-ordination of EC policy in general, and to brief the Prime Minister before every European Council. In contrast to the massive interdepartmental machinery which co-ordinated policy on EPU, the EMU discussions were handled by a more select group. There were contacts at various levels involving the Treasury, the FCO, Cabinet Office, and Bank of England Where BoE opinion differed from the Treasury, it was not able to convince the latter of its views during discussions in London. It argued that the supervisory functions of the ECB, as outlined in Article 105 (6) and Chapter V, Article 25, of the Protocol on the ECB, should have had a more positive provision within the Treaty than that eventually provided for. 35 The rather tortuous wording of Article 25 stressed that if the Council of Ministers decided at some point in the future, that circumstances warranted a specific supervisory role being given to the ECB, they could pass legislation to provide it with such authority. It was a negative rather than positive provision, resulting in a split between the Treasury and the BoE. Some Member States, including the UK and France, were somewhat nervous that they were ceding a considerable degree of influence to the ECB, and therefore wished to limit the range of activities over which it had such independence. They considered that to
give it responsibility for supervision at the European level was too extensive a range of powers, and accordingly it was extremely unlikely that the BoE would have exerted influence at the European negotiating Lilley at the DTI also were sceptical.
Within the FCO the key meeting was chaired by the Assistant Under-Secretary for EC affairs, Michael Jay. 40 The group's purpose was to resolve disputes within the FCO on issues relating to the broad aspects of the IGC, and therefore it was a policy co-ordinating group dealing with business management, rather than a policy-making group. In terms of
Ministerial linkage the group worked through the FCO Minister of State with responsibility for EC affairs, Tristan Garel-Jones, 41 and Hurd. Of the two, Garel-Jones remained in closest touch with the negotiations and with the official co-ordinating mechanisms. 42 Policymaking was divided between issues which had an internal and external impact on the EC.
Internal issues came under the control of European Community Department (Internal) (ECD(I)), headed by Michael Arthur, while an IGC unit was established within it to distribute Member States' proposals around Whitehall and to produce an agenda before, and a checklist of action points after, each meeting of the Jay Group. External issues, in particular security policy, came under the control of the European Community Department (External) (ECD(E)) and Security Policy Department, 43 headed by Emyr Jones Parry and
Stephen Gomersall respectively. Negotiating points were then subject to scrutiny by FCO legal advisers, particularly the Deputy Legal Adviser, Martin Eaton.
At a tactical level the influence of the FCO within the negotiations was particularly apparent on CFSP and the EP, where it was the dominant player within Whitehall, despite the Ministry of Defence (MoD) being involved in the former. 44 The Europhile nature of the FCO, and Major's preparedness to trust Hurd to negotiate policy, meant that it was not a coincidence that the UK's position within the CFSP dossier was one of constructive engagement, while it also acquiesced to an increase in the power of the EP. The former was a direct result of the government's intrinsic importance to CFSP; any agreement without the UK would have been virtually worthless, while the question of providing the EP with a co-decision power was not perceived to raise major matters of principle in domestic UK politics.
45
On CFSP the UK eventually advanced a text 46 in conjunction with Italy on 4 October 1991 which was a direct attempt to challenge both the Franco-German alliance within the negotiations and a means of countering any future federalist aspirations in this policy arena. 47 The benefit to the UK was the demonstration to other Member States that its concept of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which was firmly attached to NATO, was supported by another Member State. Hurd's role was crucial, harbouring a particular fondness for Italy having worked as a diplomat in Rome between 1960-63. At a domestic level backbench MPs were less aware of the government's diplomacy, being more concerned about social policy and EMU. 48 But while the text was influential in the final Maastricht outcome, as the government managed to secure that the special relationship between Western Europe and North America was a key element of the European identity, the UK conceded that 'the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence', 49 which represented a significant concession on the UK's pre-IGC position against a common defence.
Just as on CFSP, the government shifted tact from its initial broadside within the EP negotiations. Based on a belief that there was no requirement to alter the existing range of legislative acts, it was therefore not convinced of the necessity to introduce a co-decision procedure. 50 Despite the twin preference of increasing the non-legislative role of the EP and strengthening national parliaments, 51 London indicated that if co-decision was going to be included then it would be more palatable if it covered areas which were subject to the existing co-operation procedure. 52 Domestically, the significant factor was that the codecision question was hardly raised in the June 1991 Parliamentary debate, the purpose of which was to examine the government's negotiating position. advocating an increase in the EP's powers for the internal market. 54 Flexibility on internal market provisions was influenced by primary decisions having already been taken and, therefore, only secondary issues needed to be solved.
UK pliability was demonstrated at the start of the Maastricht European Council by
Major agreeing to the introduction of the co-decision, 55 primarily because he wanted to demonstrate both his commitment to the meeting and personal desire for agreement. It was perceived as an act of good faith by other Member States and, therefore, in offering movement on co-decision he expected assistance in obtaining other UK objectives. Both this development and movement on CFSP was influenced by the ability of Major and Hurd to resolve policy with little influence coming from other Cabinet Ministers, or the wider Parliamentary Party. Yet where policy was subject to wider Cabinet influence, the resolution of differences became a more complex matter. Ministers dealing with specific portfolios could display a strong command of detail relevant to their particular field of competence, but were less sure-footed with issues which involved a wider reference.
Hence, while UK acceptance of the co-decision procedure contradicted the natural Eurosceptic instincts of Baker, Howard, Lamont and Lilley, their insufficient knowledge of this policy area meant that they did not raise objections within Cabinet.
Knowledge is Power: Social Policy
Despite the Foreign Office's remit encompassing the majority of IGC policy, it was not able to determine UK preferences on social policy because the DfE took particular responsibility in this connection, which placed the Secretary of State, Michael Howard, in a particularly strong position. 56 This, combined with the fact that it was 'easier' for MPs to unite behind social policy rather than other more complex IGC topics, such as foreign policy, interior affairs and institutional reform, helped raise Howard's position within Cabinet. Significantly, because Major was younger, more inexperienced, and therefore felt himself to be primes inter pares, rather than someone who towered over the rest, he was not able to disregard the views of Ministers who were likely to accede to senior positions, and even possibly challenge for the leadership -as well as representing particular sections of support within the wider Parliamentary Party. Hence, Howard proved to be a notable influence on government policy, which was also borne out of the fact that he had been appointed to the DfE eleven months earlier and consequently had a more commanding grasp of that portfolio than other Ministers at the commencement of the negotiations (see table 1 ). (see table 2 ). By contrast, the vast majority of Europhiles were based in departments which were not crucial to IGC policy. But among the Eurosceptic Ministers, the Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, was less of a dominant figure within his own departmental remit, namely JHA. This was because a greater number of actors exercised an influence in this policy area, in particular the FCO, European
Secretariat and UKRep, which reflected Baker's lack of influence within Cabinet: he did not represent any significant faction of the Conservative Party and was also in the twilight of his career. In his memoirs he recalled that he 'urged' both Major and Hurd, on two separate occasions, to secure a renegotiation of Article 8A of the Single European Act (SEA) to ensure the UK retained control over its immigration and frontier controls. But both Major and Hurd '...felt unable to raise the whole interpretation of Article 8A and the Declaration', leaving Baker '..very disappointed that this fundamental European challenge to our sovereignty was never raised at the Maastricht meeting'. 63 Baker was effectively sidelined, his views -and personal position -not considered significant enough to merit policy change.
Indeed, the advancement of a UK text within the field of JHA arose out of Kerr's consideration that it was essential for a proposal to be developed as a means of shaping and influencing the debate, which contrasted with London's position on social policy, whereby it chose not to advance texts. Accordingly, by putting forward proposals the government acknowledged that there was a need for increased co-operation within this policy area, which had been initially signposted in the December 1990 Rome mandate, 64 although UK preferences were basically limited to the formalisation of activities previously carried out on an intergovernmental basis. 65 The Home Office's initial lack of influence reflected the absence of a European Community Unit within the department, with one finally being created in February 1991 after the advancement of the UK text. Perversely, these very negotiators had a greater ability to engage than the teams which lead on EPU. The Wicks-Kerr team were more aware of the government's objectives than was the case on EPU, where there tended to be a mindfulness only of what it did not want (which, we may infer, was practically everything). Because EMU was a Treasury negotiation, with very little influence from outside departments other than the FCO, it was far easier to resolve a Whitehall line. In contrast, if policy needed clarification on EPU, numerous departments could have a viewpoint. This resulted in a slower decision-making process and, because many government Ministers were involved on EPU, when they met to discuss IGC issues they often ended up focusing on non-IGC issues which they considered to be more important. The possibility for this happened far less on EMU, but because the political tone of the government was against the project, the EMU negotiators were just as handicapped.
In effect, London's success was limited to specific, detailed points, notably the inclusion of 'gross errors' in Article 104c (2) , which ensured that the excessive deficit procedure should only occasionally come into being by taking account of cyclical developments.
Otherwise, it obtained the inclusion of the 'ways and means' facility within the EMU optout text, 68 while on EPU it achieved the inconspicuous inclusion of the Barber Protocol 
Conclusion
It is evident that the IGC negotiations on EPU and EMU were handled in different ways.
The EMU talks were simpler, with very little need for inter-departmental co-ordination because of the singular nature of the subject. But the government's preference not be committed to a single currency reduced the influence negotiators had in the IGC, both at an official and Ministerial level, the latter being the result of Lamont's scepticism towards EMU. In contrast, within EPU there existed a greater consultation procedure, involving numerous government departments because of the broad nature of the subjects discussed during the IGC. Whereas policy on EMU was essentially decided within the Treasury, EPU decisions were channelled through the European Secretariat. But, because topics touched on a greater number of departments, and because decisions were often subject to prolonged, and personal discussion, the government was not always clear as to what its position was on the numerous points the EPU IGC debated. In addition, as the EPU negotiations were more wide-ranging, and as the government had its eye on particular issues such as social policy, it did not give proper attention to all aspects of the negotiations. Such developments meant clear policy objectives were not always forthcoming for the government's EPU negotiators in particular. They were not tied to a government line, but were instead tied to the absence of a government line on many policy issues (particularly EPU). This was not a reflection of a failure of policy co-ordination: many meetings were arranged, but at Ministerial level they were often cancelled, or hijacked by other topics which were deemed to be more important. On EMU, which was principally driven by the Treasury, it was easier for a negotiating line to be established and translated into a set of instructions for the negotiators. On EPU, where issues impinged on numerous departments, and where there existed differences on policy objectives, for example with Chris Patten favouring a softer UK line on social policy, and Howard desiring the reverse, the government did not manage to establish a clear set of policy objectives, not least because of domestic political opinion. 25 While Kerr and Hadley were broadly aware of Ministers' desires on EPU issues, how those objectives would, or could, be won was not clear. Furthermore, there existed a naiveté at Ministerial level as to how the negotiations could be conducted. There was a lack of awareness as to the necessity for the UK to offer some form of flexibility by accepting policies which, although unpalatable, meant that other key objectives would be more easily obtained. The result was the attainment of a deal at Maastricht 72 which broadly satisfied the government's demands. In the process of the negotiations, the very fact the UK made headway equally relied on the skill of Hadley at the UK end and Kerr at the Brussels end, and on the Wicks-Kerr team on EMU, although the latter were made more aware of what was acceptable or not. This is not to say the agreements were necessarily a success for the UK, but they could be presented as 'Game, Set and Match' for the government. 
